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CHAPTER 6
Privatizing State-Owned Enterprises
Abstract This chapter describes the formulas for privatization that were
used to privatize almost all state-owned assets in Georgia between 2004
and 2011, including its ports, airports, water utilities, and power grid. To
improve service levels and ensure long-term economic feasibility for inves-
tors, the government followed a best-practice process, comprising ﬁve
steps – from replacing top managers and laying down the regulatory
framework for the future private companies to screening and selecting
bidders. The chapter also explains why Georgia’s railway and its oil and gas
corporation were exempt from full privatization. It concludes with a
discussion of alternatives to outright privatization, such as issuing
Eurobonds and establishing public-private partnership funds, which com-
bine the beneﬁts of competitive pressure on public enterprises with gov-
ernmental control.
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Between 2004 and 2011, Georgia privatized almost all state-owned
assets, including its ports, airports, water utilities, and power grid. To
improve service levels, protect the long-term interests of the state, and
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ensure sufﬁciently attractive returns for investors, the government fol-
lowed a ﬁve-step process:
1. Step one was to replace top management with new or interim man-
agers, since incumbent directors showed little interest in successful
privatization.
2. Step two was to restructure state-owned enterprises, in particular to
lay off those employees who had been hired for the wrong reasons.
This step was both painful and unpopular, but inevitable, since even
the smallest inefﬁciency would have increased the bargaining power
of potential investors.
3. Step three was to lay down the regulatory framework for the future
private companies, e.g., their suppliers, customers, and mid-term
obligations.
4. Step fourwas to draft tender documents and privatization agreements.
5. Step ﬁve was to screen and select bidders in an open auction.
Only Georgia’s railway and its oil and gas corporation were exempt from
privatization for geopolitical reasons. These assets remain under public
control, but the government has taken innovative steps to improve their
performance.
6.1 THE CHALLENGE
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) everywhere are a hotbed for inefﬁciency,
and Georgia was no exception. In the early 2000s, corruption was the
norm at its SOEs. Politicians treated SOEs as their personal cash cows, and
most decisions were driven by greed, rather than by an interest to promote
the greater good of the country as a whole. For example, members of
government routinely appointed people to leadership positions at SOEs in
return for handouts or other favors. This is what it’s like in many other
countries, be they developed or developing, even today. Unless the gov-
ernment takes special precautions, SOEs invariably veer toward inefﬁ-
ciency and corruption. The root cause of this tendency is the fact that
the state, as the owner, has little inherent interest in maximizing the proﬁt
of an SOE. There are plenty of other sources of budgetary income, such as
taxes and customs, and the resources of SOEs can be used in many ways
other than to maximize net proﬁt: to ﬁnance politically sensitive projects
and hide them from parliamentary review, to secure the favor of voters
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prior to an election, or simply to ﬁnd employment for friends and family.
That’s what things were like in Georgia before 2004.
Whenever calls for privatization arise, politicians routinely deploy heavy
rhetorical artillery: the state should hold on to its assets and keep strategic
companies under public control. Foreign companies should not be
allowed to take over, or even manage, any “national treasures.” Such
populist appeals to pride and nationalism resonate well with many people,
especially in small developing countries. In reality, most politicians who
make this sort of declaration are only trying to protect their jobs or their
illicit income.
So how should utility, energy, and transport be managed in a modern
democracy? Is privatization the only option to prevent corruption and
increase efﬁciency? Are certain types of state-owned companies better
suited to privatization than others? Which assets, if any, should be exempt
from privatization?
The lesson we learned in Georgia, and elsewhere, is that privatization is
a double-edged sword. If you handle it well, it is a powerful tool that will
make the state stronger and bring beneﬁt to the population. If, however, it
is handled unprofessionally, let alone in a corrupt manner, it will inﬂict
harm on the state and bring disadvantage to its citizens. In any case, state-
owned enterprises should be restructured prior to privatization, and
proper regulation should be put in place to make sure future owners of
SOEs don’t exploit their position as de factomonopolists at the expense of
the public. As a general rule, at least two investors should be shortlisted for
any privatization effort to ensure some measure of competition. SOEs
from other countries should not normally be admitted as investors to
take over an SOE. One SOE buying up another SOE doesn’t really qualify
as privatization, and it doesn’t bring the full beneﬁt from the perspective
of the state. Even if future losses will be absorbed by another government,
chances are that the new company will be no more efﬁcient than its
predecessor. Finally, governments should not hesitate to hire reputable
consulting companies to help with the legal, ﬁnancial, and transactional
aspects of the privatization process, or even have contractors manage
SOEs for a limited transitional period prior to privatization. All potential
investors will be working with the best experts in their ﬁelds, and the least
a responsible government can do is make sure it is on an equal footing with
bidders in this respect. Negotiating a well-structured, proﬁtable deal is no
small matter. It goes beyond the expertise of even the ﬁnest public
servants, which is why the fees of experts will easily pay for themselves.
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In Georgia, we followed a ﬁve-step privatization process, and it served
us well. I recommend that other countries take inspiration from it and
adapt it to their needs.
6.2 THE FIVE-STEP PROCESS
Step 1 is to replace the CEO and directors of the company. Nobody
likes to kill their darlings, and if you have managed a company for
years, or even decades, that company inevitably will have become your
darling. You will feel that you have given it your all, and that your team
has done the best it could – the best, in fact, anybody could have done
under the circumstances. From the perspective of a veteran, bringing
in new managers will look like a waste of resources. Nine out of ten
times, an incumbent CEO will not support the privatization process.
Leaving an SOE’s top team in place prior to privatization is the biggest
mistake governments can make. The old guard will often not disclose
relevant information to potential investors they don’t approve of, at
least not fully and truthfully, and they will impair the impact of
privatization by striking shady deals with the future owners of the
SOE to keep their jobs. The mission of an incoming CEO and top
team should be very clear: ensure successful privatization, period.
Typically, this is a temporary rather than a permanent assignment,
and the government should be clear about this from the start. The
objective for the new management is to restructure the company and
sell it. Ideally, remuneration is tied to the total value created through
the privatization contract, including the price of the sale and any
investment obligations imposed on the new owner.
Step 2 is to restructure the company. Almost all SOEs are inefﬁcient in one
way or another. Common issues include:
• Employees hired solely as a favor to politicians
• Managers promoted to positions of leadership based on tenure or
political afﬁliation, rather than qualiﬁcation or performance
• Onerous contracts causing the SOE incessant losses
To ﬁx these issues, you need political consensus that the company is to be
privatized, and that the government should take the appropriate measures
to ﬁnd a high-caliber investor, get the best possible price, and secure the
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commitment of the prospective new owner to invest in the company in
future. To achieve these objectives, the company must be as lean and
efﬁcient as possible prior to privatization – lay off employees who are not
needed, replace managers who are not qualiﬁed for their positions, and re-
negotiate or terminate unfavorable contracts. It is a common, but costly,
mistake to leave these issues to the new owners. The fact is that every little
inefﬁciency of an SOE gives undue bargaining power to potential investors
during negotiations and will decrease the total value of the privatization
contract.
Step 3 is to set up a proper regulatory framework. It should cover the
following questions: Are the processes required to ensure proper checks
and balances already in place? Or will it be very difﬁcult for the govern-
ment to understand what is going on in the sector in question after
privatization? Speciﬁcally, is a proper reporting requirement in place to
keep the government in the loop? What is the structure of the tariff
system? Is it sufﬁciently attractive to attract reputable companies as
investors and ensure they resist the temptation of making money on
the side? Is there any danger of the new owner exploiting the mono-
polistic position of the company? If yes, which precautions are required
to minimize the risk of the new owner besting the state or its custo-
mers? Rules and regulations for the sector in question must be clear and
transparent to all parties to enable them to take fact-based, well-
informed decisions.
Step 4 is to prepare the tender documents and draft the actual privatiza-
tion agreement, ideally with the help of well-established international
consultants. The contract should not only specify the terms and condi-
tions of the deal itself, but also spell out the investment obligations of
the future owner for the next ﬁve to seven years. The deal should be
structured in a way that balances multiple objectives:
• Provide an attractive investment opportunity for the bidder
• Attract investment to the company and make it more efﬁcient
• Help the rest of the economy become more competitive
• Secure better service in the sector in question
• Maximize total long-term value creation for the state
Step 5 is the actual selection process. This should start with a roadshow and
advertisements as required to attract the best players in the sector or industry
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in question. An open auction should be held with the most suitable bidders.
For details on auctions, also see the chapter on Fighting Corruption.
Typically, the right to participate in the ﬁrst round of negotiations will
go to the bidder offering the highest price. The highest sale price,
however, will not always be the best deal. From the perspective of the
state, value creation can take many different shapes. More efﬁcient
operations, better management, transfer of know-how, and future
investment obligations can easily compensate for a slightly lower sale
price. In any case, the contract should protect the long-term interests of
the state and allow the investor to make a good, clean proﬁt in the
medium term. That is why it is very important to deﬁne and commu-
nicate the selection criteria and their weighting upfront: Will the ﬁnal
decision be taken based on price alone? Will obligations regarding future
investments play a role? What about management experience and tech-
nical expertise? Personally, I have found that it is best to use only criteria
that can be quantiﬁed in the last tender and to create a clear-cut formula
as to how they will factor in the decision. Qualitative criteria, such as an
experienced management team, should only be used in the initial screen-
ing stage. In other words, bidders who do not fulﬁll these criteria should
not even be admitted to the ﬁnal round. And once a bidder is admitted to
the ﬁnal round, qualitative criteria should not be applied again, assuming
that all participants who have made it this far satisfy the government’s
qualitative requirements.
Regarding the ﬁnal round itself, it is crucial to create a formula that all
parties understand. This is exactly what we did when we put one of the
utilities in Georgia out for tender. From the perspective of the govern-
ment, it was crucial for the tariffs to stay as low as possible for as long as
possible, and we made this clear to all potential investors. We also
deﬁned the investments the future owner of the utility would have to
make over the course of the coming years. Based on these preconditions,
we asked potential investors to submit proposals specifying tariff levels
for the next seven years and the price they were willing to pay. The
formula we would apply to select the winning proposal was predeﬁned
and clearly communicated to bidders: a speciﬁc weight was given to the
tariff for every year, and these weights added up to account for 50
percent of the decision. The remaining 50 percent weight was attached
to the price the bidder was willing to pay. Thanks to the transparent
approach, this turned out to be one of the most efﬁcient tenders we ever
conducted.
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6.3 THE OUTCOME IN GEORGIA
Between 2004 and 2011, almost all state-owned assets in Georgia were
successfully privatized based on the ﬁve-step process outlined previously.
Examples include ports and airports, electricity and gas distribution com-
panies, hydroelectric power plants, and water utility companies. These
efforts were successful in several respects:
• Investors fulﬁlled the obligations imposed under the respective pri-
vatization contracts. Speciﬁcally, they invested substantial amounts of
capital and transformed formerly troubled SOEs into ﬁnancially
sound private companies.
• The new companies grew in terms of efﬁciency and effectiveness.
• Consumers and corporate customers were happy with how the new
companies performed and the services they provided.
• Investors were happy. They made sizable upfront investments, but
now they are reaping the rewards in the form of substantial proﬁts.
In 2005, for example, Tbilisi airport was privatized by way of a build-
operate-transfer (BOT) contract with TAV, a Turkish company that also
operates the airports of Istanbul in Turkey, Skopje in Macedonia, Zagreb
in Croatia, and in many other cities in the region. In 2007, Tbilisi airport
was thoroughly renovated and expanded, tripling its annual passenger
capacity. Today, the airport connects Georgia to various international
destinations such as Rome, Paris, Moscow, Istanbul, Dubai, Frankfurt
and others. In contrast, privatization efforts were less successful in those
cases in which a Georgian SOE was taken over by an SOE from another
country. The investments the foreign SOEs made were usually both
insufﬁcient and inefﬁcient. Generally, the new companies did not receive
the attention and the support they would have required.
But the vast majority of privatization efforts was successful. Our experi-
ence shows that privatized companies are more efﬁcient than SOEs, and that
they contribute to economic growth within and beyond their industries,
more so than SOEs. Because private companies are proﬁt-oriented and
cannot rely on state subsidies, they are forced to innovate more, to attract
better personnel, to develop better know-how, to invest more in R&D, and
to adopt superior management practices. And unlike most SOEs, they do
not consume public funds. Instead, they contribute to the state’s budget by
paying taxes, and the proceeds of privatization itself can be invested by the
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government to develop new infrastructure. Generally, managers of priva-
tized companies have a much bigger incentive to improve performance than
the directors of SOEs, which is why all state-owned assets should be priva-
tized – unless privatization brings undue geopolitical tension.
6.4 STRATEGIC ASSETS
Since the dawn of capitalism, politicians and economists have debated the
limits of privatization. Are there any companies that a government should
never sell because of strategic considerations? For example, will the privatiza-
tion of electricity distribution, electricity transmission, or railway operations
put the country at a disadvantage in times of geopolitical turmoil? The
experience in Georgia shows that there are, in fact, such strategic assets,
and that the government should not sell them, at least not without taking
proper precautions to protect the interests of the state. However, our
experience also shows that the nature of such strategic assets differs from
country to country. What is more, we also found that there is an attractive
middle ground between state ownership and blunt privatization, and that
some strategic assets can be considered for partial privatization, provided the
underlying contract is well designed and regulation is appropriate to protect
the interests of the state. In a nutshell: you can sell anything, or almost
anything, if the contract and the regulation are watertight.
Examples of privatizing these so-called strategic assets and due to prudent
regulations being still under control even during most difﬁcult geopolitical
situation, include privatization of Telasi, Tbilisi’s electricity distribution
company, and the partial divestment (50 percent share) of the transmission
line connecting the Georgian and Russian energy grids. In both cases,
although the investors were state-owned or state-controlled Russian com-
panies, neither of these entities were used against Georgia’s interests during
the Russian invasion. The regulation that was put in place was well crafted
and very straight forward and the management of the companies knew very
well that in case it acted against the national interests of the government they
would have been taken over (managerially not ownership wise) by the
regulator. During the war, these companies followed closely instructions
from the central dispatcher, and energy supply was neither interrupted nor
impaired at any point. Thanks to good regulation, strategic assets remained
under the government’s control during this sensitive period.
Surely, experts in most countries would classify electricity distribution
and the high-voltage power grid as highly sensitive and potentially
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vulnerable parts of a state’s technical infrastructure. But if even these assets
can be in the hands of a hostile foreign power during a war without harm
coming to the country, which other assets, if any, should the government
not privatize for strategic reasons? In Georgia’s case, it was the Georgian
Railway (GR) and the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC).
Because of tense political relations between two of Georgia’s neighbors,
Azerbaijan and Armenia, privatizing the GR and the GOGC could have
turned into a geopolitical conﬂict, a conﬂict that would have been disas-
trous for the whole region and for Georgia itself. This is because almost all
of Armenia’s imports use the GR, and almost 100 percent of Armenia’s gas
consumption goes through the GOGC. Everybody agreed that political
stability was much more important than any commercial beneﬁt that
might come from the privatization of these assets. The Georgian govern-
ment decided to hold on to the GR and the GOGC, lest they be used as
geopolitical weapons by an investor, a foreign power, or any other party.
In these cases, privatization was not an option. However, we still wanted
to improve efﬁciency and introduce a certain performance culture at the GR
and the GOGC. The solution we found was to have these companies issue
corporate Eurobonds at the London Stock Exchange. The idea was to
measure the performance of the top team, and reward it with bonuses,
based on the difference between sovereign Eurobonds (issued by Georgia’s
national government) and corporate Eurobonds (issued by GR and the
GOGC).1 In effect, we had the world’s ﬁnancial markets assess the perfor-
mance of the respective management teams for us. High demand, and the
resulting high valuation, of GR and GOGC bonds would signify that inves-
tors believed in the leadership teams and did not see major risks regarding the
future performance of these companies. This step motivated the managers at
GR and the GOGC to be transparent, seek close relations with investors, and
to adopt best management practices. As a side effect – managers of these
companies acted as best salespersons of the country itself – as most questions
from investors were about the country’s economic situation. All of this helped
to advance the performance not only of these companies but also of Georgia’s
economy as a whole, and I believe that other developing countries would
beneﬁt in similar ways.
As mentioned previously – privatization can go wrong and hurt a coun-
try’s economy for long term. In the Ukraine, for example, the privatization
of state assets went wrong in a big way in the 1990s. It resulted in a situation
in which a handful of oligarchs control most of these assets, a major obstacle
to the country’s growth. The oligarchs inUkraine, inmany cases, have their
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own political parties, control part of themedia and control different parts of
the government. They are primarily motivated by the desire to defend/
increase their wealth and fortify their political positions, not by any great
urge to advance the prosperity of the country as a whole. Their interests do
not coincide with the interests of the country and any positive initiative by
one is accepted by others as a potential threat and is blocked.
In the autumnof 2015, I was invited toKiev to presentGeorgian economic
reforms to the Ukrainian government. After presenting the Georgian story to
all stakeholders (members of government and IFIs, representatives of private
sector and NGOs) I met with a Ukrainian minister of economy. As a way out
of the predicament, I offered him an out-of-box solution that may have
changed the country and create a stepping stone for the turnaround path of
Ukrainian economy. The idea was to adopt a legislation that would oblige the
oligarchs within speciﬁc a timeframe to take their companies to international
ﬁnancial markets (e.g., London Stock Exchange) to IPO (formula for priva-
tization – Initial Public Offering). This may have been very much accepted by
all oligarchs as all of them, being in the same situation, would have been calm
that nobody is taking their assets from them (but they are maximizing their
wealth on the international ﬁnancial markets) and would force them to act in
the best interests of the country – their successful IPOs and thus their wealth
would depend on how well country is performing. On top, they would be
forced to attract best managers with international experience in their compa-
nies, clean up the most important assets, and start paying taxes fully. The
minister loved the idea. He shook my hand and said that he would do his best
to take the proposal to the president and that he would come back to me. He
never did. The government of the Ukraine, including the minister of econ-
omy, has since been succeeded by a new administration. It still remains to be
seen if the new government will be up to thinking out of the box and adopt
this or a similar regulation. Using existing experiences only may not be the
best solution for particular problems. Innovative approaches to new problems
are required in cases and the Ukrainian case, I believe, is one of them.
6.5 PARTNERSHIP FUNDS
Another tool to improve the performance of SOEs without privatizing them
is to set up public-private partnership funds. The Georgian government
established such a partnership fund in 2010, set up as a holding entity that
holds shares of large SOEs and uses dividend income, privatization proceeds,
or bond proceeds to develop new infrastructure in cooperation with the
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private sector. The main objective was to assist international investors with
the ﬁnancing of large-scale infrastructure projects. Because of the relatively
small size of Georgia’s economy at the time, it was difﬁcult to convince
investors to shoulder the full risk ofmajor infrastructure investments without
public co-ﬁnancing or state guarantees. Promising projects were stalled
because investors felt the investment was too large relative to the size of
the country’s economy. These projects promised robust returns on invest-
ment, but they required investments exceeding 6 percent of Georgia’s GDP,
and investors would only consider these projects if the state would chip in
with co-ﬁnancing or back them up with guarantees.
The government, however, was unwilling to give outright guarantees.
This was because the country had had negative experiences with such
guarantees in the past. They had mostly been used to ﬁll the coffers of
corrupt individuals rather than to help develop the country’s economy. So
the partnership fund (PF) was created. Its objective was to help the private
sector with major investments in infrastructure that would beneﬁt the coun-
try as a whole without having to grant governmental guarantees. The PF
held shares of all major SOEs – such as GR, GOGC, and GSE2 – and was the
ﬁnancial beneﬁciary of these companies, but the PFwas not to be involved in
the day-to-day management of these SOEs. The primary role of the PF was
to set dividend policies for these companies in cooperation with theMinistry
of Finance and other relevantministries. Additionally, the PFwould invest in
large-scale infrastructure projects in cooperation with the private sector.
Initially, it was anything but trivial to ﬁnd the golden middle ground
between a hands-off investment approach and a hands-on management
approach. The private sector was concerned that the PF would act as their
competitor. Which sectors would it get involved in? What, exactly, would its
goal be? Turn a proﬁt for the government? Create jobs? Bring consumer prices
down? Would the PF have privileged access to foreign direct investment in a
particular sector at the expense of private companies? How would the fund
choose its partners – based on experience, on co-ﬁnancing, or in exchange for
bribes? All of these concerns brought uncertainty to the economy, at least
initially. Yet we believed that it was worth the effort to hang in and resolve
these issues. The PF was, quite simply, the only way to get big things built in a
small economy like Georgia, where the construction of a single large Hydro
Power Plant (HPP) would require an investment in the magnitude of 10
percent of the country’s GDP.
To address the concerns of the private sector and hedge the risk of the
investment, Georgia’s PF was given very limited powers. The areas and
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speciﬁc projects in which the PF would invest were speciﬁed in advance.
The fund was only to invest in projects of a certain size, and its co-
ﬁnancing capacity was restricted to a maximum of 49 percent of equity.
Also, the fund was obliged to sell its share in any project within four to ﬁve
years to the private partner company or another investor. Additionally, a
special supervisory board was established. It consisted of members of the
government and representatives of the private sector, mainly of the bank-
ing sector. This was to prevent the PF from competing with private banks
for suitable projects and from taking business away from them.
Unfortunately, the PF did not consult the board as actively as the govern-
ment had originally envisaged. This created considerable unrest among
private sector players. These drawbacks do not, however, discredit the con-
cept of a state-owned ﬁnancial vehicle tasked with helping private investors
ﬁnance large infrastructure projects in developing countries. They merely
illustrate that any such vehicle requires a clear deﬁnition of its role and duties
by legislation, as well asmeticulousmanagement and oversight, tomake sure
it beneﬁts both the public and the private sector.
NOTES
1. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sovereignbond.asp; http://www.
investopedia.com/terms/c/corporatebond.asp (retrieved in May 2016).
2. Georgian Railway, Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, and Georgian State
Electrosystem.
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